Perceptions and Reactions of Ahmadiyya to Fatwa Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI): An Antrophological Lingusitics Approach

Over the past two decades, the trend of fatwa requests has increased. Fatwas issued by certain individuals or organizations are used as references in daily life. Likewise in Indonesia through the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) where the desire for asking fatwas is almost the same as the desire for implementing the fatwa itself. Including fatwas related to religious sects such as Ahmadiyya which are often become victims of discrimination and assault. Studies of this research focuses on texts fatwa issued by MUI on Ahmadiyya sect in 1980 and 2005. This study departs from the claims of some researchers who think that the fatwa had a strong correlation with actions and violent behavior that befell the Ahmadiyya Community. Use an anthropological linguistic approach, this study show Jemaah Ahmadiyya considers that fatwas are opinion. As usual opinion, he must be respected. Disagreement with an opinion is common. Because opinions are not binding. Such a pedestal of thinking simultaneously raises attitudes and responses that tend to appear to 'accept what we are'. However, if examined more closely, there are a number of efforts which although they are 'sporadic' and are not interpreted as a specific strategy to counter the actual heretical labelling efforts carried out by the Jemaah Ahmadiyya.

Habib Abdurrahman Assegaf gave an ultimatum to the Ahmadiyya Community to leave the Mubarak Campus. The building must be emptied. If not, the masses will take over and force their way.
They were given 7x24 hours to go.
Some who arrived at the Mubarak Campus first put up banners that read "Post Dissolution of Ahmadiyya". Occasionally they take pictures while throwing agitative sentences. "Let's take pictures in front of the sign before we destroy them," said one person. The crowd who came tried to push and asked to enter the main gate. They push each other. Many officials, but their existence did not help much. In fact, in an amateur videotape, it was clear that a number of police officers from the civil service enthusiastically joined in demolishing the signposts bearing the identity of the Jemaah Ahmadiyya Mubarak Campus. The action of pushing each other ignited emotions and not longs afterwards the action of throwing each other into a single sight on the Mubarak Campus.
Bottle fragments hurt Jemaah Ahmadiyya, mostly women and children, which at that time was being held Jalsah Salanah. Throw after throw came over. Some can be avoided, but not a few hurt the limbs, even the head of the congregation. While the conditions in the area of the Mubarak Campus complex were chaotic, the mass outside the gate which also scattered along the highway that connects Parung-Bogor was increasingly violent and raging. Some of them shouted. Squealing.
Shouting takbir. Shouts of "infidels", "apostates", and "heretics", sounded very loud. The masses that partially used the attributes that read the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) knocked down the ornate gates made by Jemaah Ahmadiyya in order to celebrate the Jalsah Salanah activities. After rummaging through the main gate and bombarding the rocks to the congregation. (Rogers, 2014: 71;Hasyim, 2019: 1;Mariani, 2013: 16-17;Burhani, 2016: 140) Thousands of Ahmadiyya congregations who are still on the campus of Mubarak were frightened. Small children, women carry anxiety. While some men try to calm down. Some of the others did seem to get emotional, but some congregations cautioned that all actions taken must be with the approval of Amir (the leader of the Ahmadiyya Community).
"If the amir says fight, we are fighting. But amir did not order us to fight. We only defend ourselves with tools as we have." (Murtiyono Yusuf Ismail, 28 July 2018) Rage struck the minds of the Ahmadiyya Congregation. They felt that the Mubarak Campus was their home. Their organizational status is also legal. In fact, since 1953. Throughout the 2000s, even before the reforms none of the anarchist events were addressed to them.
if even deemed deviant Ahmadiyya should not be allowed to stand by the Government. But in reality the government officially gave permission for the establishment of the Ahmadiyya Congregation through the Decree of the Minister of Justice of the Republic of Indonesia No. JA 5/23/13 Date 13-3-1953. (Zulkarnain, 2005Sevea, 2009: 134-148;Burhani, 2020: 207-211) (Fadhillah, 2017: 35-52) All three indeed befall the Ahmadiyya Community. In the Tempo report, it was stated that since the 1990s the Ahmadiyya Community of Indonesia had always lived under pressure and also threats. These This shows that a series of treatments in the form of violence and discrimination continue to occur to this day. The issue of Ahmadiyya is increasingly becoming a main issue when talking about minorities, especially in the Indonesian context.

Fatwa and Liyan Stereotype
The phenomenon of the MUI fatwas which have lately become a trending topic and the lips of the people is actually not a new phenomenon. He has actually happened since decades ago. The escalation of conversation and debate increased after the new order. This condition is of course due to the increasingly patterned color of thought in the MUI, but at the same time there is a wave of purification of thought due to battles and struggles and debates within the MUI. The voice of the ulama whose style of thinking is more right, in fact is louder. The color of the fatwa becomes so rigid and tends to be 'hard' (Hosen, 2004: 147;Suaedy, 2018: 290;Fuller, 2011: 11). That is, how could letters and fatwas be made with reference to recommendations and decisions that were only four years later? Of course in this context this fatwa is worth questioning.
Uniquely, in Suaedy's note that the fatwa of the MUI on Ahmadiyya issued in 1980 was in no way followed by a variety of acts of violence and also attacks. This means that in the 1980s or when the MUI fatwa on Ahmadiyya was first issued an escalation of conflict and attacks have not been found, or even nonexistent (Suaedy & Maarif, 2006: 263).
Meanwhile, in the MUI fatwa issued in 2005, the upstream fatwa used was the "Flow of Ahmadiyya". MUI seems to respond to the condition of the community on the ground which in fact does not really understand -or perhaps does not want to know -what is the difference between Ahmadiyya Qadiyan and Lahore. In practice the community did not really understand the difference between the Ahmadiyya Community of Qadiyan and Lahore. So, in the dictum of the fatwa issued on July 28, 2005, the MUI mentions globally "Ahmadiyya Flow." Even if it refers to the 1980 fatwa, the only one that is prohibited and deviated is the Qadiyan Ahmadiyya. Even so, in this context, as stated by Basuki (one of the members of the Ahmadiyya Central Committee) that MUI until now has never provided a thorough explanation of the Nine Ahmadiyya books that were used as a reference to decide that the sect is heretical and misleading (Basuki, 28 July 2018).
In the meantime, if we explore deeper than the fatwas issued by the MUI regarding the field of aqidah, there are 14 fatwas. The fourteen fatwas concerning schools which are considered deviant and misguided (also misleading). However, what is very interesting to note is that fatwas about deviant flows are generally issued only once. Fatwas challenged by the Flow of Salamullah, Islamic Jemaah, Darul Arqam, Lia Eden, Al-Qiyadah Islamiah, and also Gafatar for example, all were issued once. Unlike the Ahmadiyya which was officially issued twice with two explanations as well. This 'special' condition is worth making us wonder, why did that happen? What's wrong with Ahmadiyya?
Is it so dangerous for the movement so that the MUI, even later the state intervened to 'discipline' it?  (Soekarno, 2017: 63).
In addition to fatwas about religious schools or thoughts that often lead to controversy, debates also often approach the MUI fatwas for the field of muamalah or social relations. Fatwa number 56 of 2016 concerning the use of Christmas attributes, for example, is the ian tasalsul '(repeatedly endless) event that is the umpteenth time. Even on the same topic, about Christmas, the MUI also issued a fatwa regarding the prohibition of saying merry Christmas. Gus Dur wrote an essay entitled "Fatwa Natal: Ujung dan Pangkal". Gus Dur very sarcastically said that the MUI was an institution that was made only to be a liaison between the government and the followers of Islam, and that the link was often troubling rather than reassuring.
Furthermore, Abdurrahman questioned the fact that the MUI fatwa was in fact never found its end and base. This means that the upstream and downstream problems have never been resolved. Because it is endless, the problem will not be resolved and tends to cause new problems. In the language of science, things like this will be called a cycle (repetition).
"If there is no desire to set the end of the problem, perhaps we may not allow Christians to take a taxi in their glass with Arabic calligraphy Bismillahirrahmanirrahim. How airy is the air of our lives, if that happen!" (Wahid, 2007: 27) in addition to failing to determine the tip and base of the question, MUI basically has a problem with the pattern of preaching communication. The pattern of preaching communication applied by the MUI has tended to be more repressive than compromise. The pattern of repressive propaganda communication like this one day will result in a lay understanding that religion, especially Islam, has a very rigid and creepy character. Such lay understanding is of course not without reason, considering that disappointment that comes from a lack of tolerance and poor communication of preaching will gradually lead the lay to reduce their belief in Islam. In fact, Islam in the dictum of its preaching is more self-proclaimed as a religion that gives grace to the exclamation of all nature (rahmatan lil 'ālamīn). The MUI's persuasive function in preaching we suppose as Walisongo's preaching in the days of Islamizing the island of Java. The cultural approach that is embracing provides education and understanding to the community without patronizing it so that Islam reaps very high sympathy. The pattern of Walisongo's preaching communication is of course based on an understanding of the "fields" of preaching concerning the socio-demographic of the community. Of course we cannot conclusively conclude that the MUI did not understand the "fields" of its preaching. But as an effort to improve it is better if the MUI also begins to more deeply study and reformulate the pattern of communication of preaching. This is based on the increasing number of rejections both attitudes and verbal.
The fact that the language of the MUI propaganda communication often takes a one-sided judgment can be found, for example, related to the fatwa deviating from Ahmadiyya number: 05 / Kep / Munas II / MUI / 1980. In the decree, it was written "In accordance with the data and fatwa found in 9 books on Ahmadiyya, the Indonesian Ulama Council states that Ahmadiyya is a congregation outside of Islam, misguided and misleading." The sentence is written in language with a true diction provocative namely "misguided and misleading".
In fact, there are two typologies of preaching movements. The first is compromise preaching and the second is non-compromise preaching.
Compromising preaching is preaching that puts forward the values of dialogue and is accommodative by using a persuasive communication approach. This kind of Preaching is suitable for use in a pluralistic sociological environment as Indonesia. While on the other hand, noncompromise preaching is preaching which tends to be repressive by using power tools as a symbol of legitimacy. Usually it is implemented through regional regulations, regulations and even laws as in Saudi Arabia.
Thus, in this context it is good that the MUI begins to reorganize the pattern of preaching and its "fatwa language". If this is not the case, finding the reality of the people who tend to be "farther away from religious values" today, is inevitability they will gradually see Islam not as it was assigned to the Prophet Muhammad, namely as basyīran wa nażīran. Islam has the task of making happy creatures happy, and then showing the limits of happiness that is not excessive.

Political Commodities, Not Ideology
Every time a case of an attack occurs, every time a shocking political issue is followed. The spokesperson for the Ahmadiyya Yendra Specifically for number two, which is about the timing of the attack adjacent to the MUI Fatwa decision on the Ahmadiyya sect, in this context it is interesting to explore and question more deeply: first, whether the MUI VII general assembly held on July 26-29 is really based early? If it is true that the schedule of the MUI VII national consultation will be carried out on that date from the beginning, then is it true that in this activity one of the material is a discussion about the Ahmadiyya sect. Why? This second question becomes very important to be examined more deeply. Because as is usually a big event, the material that will be discussed in a big event is certainly well prepared.
Moreover, there will be a lot of material that must be discussed.
Meanwhile, we know that the distance between the incidents of the Mubarak Campus attack and the MUI VII national meeting was no more than fourteen days or less than two weeks. If calculated from the outbreak of large-scale riots, namely July 15, 2008, only 13 days later, MUI issued a fatwa on the Flow of Ahmadiyya. There is something strange there. If the material about Ahmadiyya was initially not included in the agenda of the discussion of the Fatwa Commission in the MUI VII national meeting, then of course the assumption was that there were demands and pressure from various parties to the MUI to issue the fatwa. In this context, once again, thick nuances are not purely ideological, but the issue has shifted into a political commodity.
In comparison, in the context of the scale and scope of the event, we can refer to the Nahdlatul Ulama. For forums that have the same scale, namely the National Conference and a large Conference involving participants from regional management representatives, the material must be reviewed and discussed at least six months before the event takes place. Moreover, we are related to fatwa material (in NU it is called the decision of Bathsul Masāil), the process of discussing as'ilah or the matter takes a short time. Assessed, discussed, debated, until then considered feasible to be made a national decision.
Regarding the MUI National Conference event, Sholeh said that the national deliberation forum was a joint forum aimed at responding to various issues of actual publicity and corruption. Besides of course this forum is intended to conduct performance evaluations, formulate work plans, and establish work program lines for the next period. As the highest forum, the level of actuality, scope of issues, and the personnel involved are strictly selected. Because this will affect the products of the National Conference which if related to the law are called fatwas.
"Fatwas decided at the MUI National Conference forum were carried out through a long process and in-depth study. Even before that, the Central MUI Fatwa Commission Team had prepared a draft of the issues that would be addressed in the MUI National Conference and socialized the Inter-Regional Coordination Meeting" (Sholeh, 2016: 98) With such conditions, it becomes legitimate for us to be careful, even through regional coordination meetings? In fact, once again, the time between the outbreak of riots on the Mubarak Campus and the MUI VII National Conference was only thirteen days. Broadly speaking, the reasons for consideration by the MUI could be categorized into two major groups. First, the reasons are theological. Second, the reasons are sociological. On the theological grounds the MUI stated that the Ahmadiyya was in trouble because it deviated from the teachings of Islam (the majority). Secondly, the sociological reasons that were captured in the scheme were "unsettling" and "disrupting state order and security." The various reasons above, if associated with the case of sealing the mosque, of course have a problem. Mainly related to charges of sociology, that is unsettling and disturbing the peace and security of the country. This accusation must, of course, be empirically proven, whether the existence of Ahmadiyya is disturbing for the surrounding community or perhaps only a mere claim. Because for the case of sealing the Mosque in Depok, as said by Yendra, it was not preceded by conflict or riots. Jemaah Ahmadiyya has a good and harmonious relationship with the occupation of non-Ahmadis. Hospitality is maintained. But why is the government so active 'alienating' Jemaah Ahmadiyya.

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On the contrary, in the case of riots in Cianjur, what really happened was a clash between members of the Ahmadiyya Community and non-Ahmadis. Some houses burned down. The building is badly damaged. However, it is interesting that the government is silent, tends to be passive, and does not interfere. Even though such conditions (seeing the background of conflict and riots) it is very possible for a regional leader to issue a regional regulation to address the incident.
"The presence of the government, in the context of addressing the Ahmadiyya Congregation, will increasingly make things worse, if whose concerned (government) does not put himself in a fair and right position" (Yendra Budiana, 28 July 2018) In this context, Bourdieu's contribution of thought is very important and has very high relevance to guess and read how the process of shifting conflicts that plagued the Ahmadiyya Community from ideological to political commodities. Rey in Bourdieu on Religion: Imposing Faith and Legitimacy, represent how 'the workings of religion' which in certain conditions can be used as an asset to embrace and reach 'victory' in a battle arena. Both the battles are in the social, economic and political spheres. In very simple language, Bourdieu's concept -as discussed by Rey -can be explained by looking at the phenomenon of the proliferation of religious leaders at present. This factin Rey's languageis very scary. In certain contexts, we cannot generalize that the proliferation of religious leaders is same with negativity, but the presence of incompetent religious leaders is a very sad phenomenon.
The presence of them -incompetent religious leaders -is often used by those who only aim to use the religious space to be used as capital and capital to fight in the spaces of socio-political arena (Rey, 2014). This phenomenon, for example, can be witnessed through the increasing number of religious leaders who position themselves as a pressure group by taking the path of influencing the thinking of many people based on the identity of a particular religion. By using symbols and verse quotes from the scriptures, they 'work' and carry out operations that are as if they are fighting for their religious interests.
Even though the truth is not so. Most of these, borrowing from Bourdieu's analysis as stated by Rey, are merely hiding in the bush of identity which is nothing but the purpose of getting a mere stage. This condition is increasingly worse when the production of religious teachers and religious leaders is influenced by a new variable: industry.

Spreading Love for Heaters
The fatwa of the MUI on Ahmadiyya in 2005 was admittedly explicitly triggered various acts of assault, violence, as well as various kinds of discrimination against the Jemaah Ahmadiyya in the following years.
Yendra Budiana said that he felt the impact of the fatwa deeply in the years after the fatwa was issued.  (Assyaukanie, 2009: 11) How does the Jemaah Ahmadiyya's attitude towards a series of discriminatory treatments often take the form of direct violence? in this context it seems that what is often ignored by a number of studies is the response of the Ahmadiyya Community to the events that befell them.
Yendra Budiana acknowledged that his group did not have specific tips, strategies, and methods to respond to a series of actions that were inflicted on them.The administrators and preachers of the Ahmadiyya only provided the congregation with the doctrine of spreading love and affection, even for haters. This is in line with the motto of the Ahmadiyya Congregation which was echoed by Mirza Nashir Ahmad "Love for All, Hatred for none". This doctrine was triggered in order to respond to threats and also the actions of orthodox clerics who tried to stop the steps and preaching of Ahmadiyya in Pakistan in mid-1974 (Lavan, 1974: 235;Lavan, 1976: 57) In the context of Indonesia, the Ahmadiyya Community in addition to holding the doctrine above, its movement also relies on what they claim to be the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad reads "ḥubbul Waṭan Minal Īmān" which means love for the homeland is part of faith.
In one official presentation, the Ahmadiyya Congregation said: Fadhillah (2017) notes that in facing a series of discriminatory treatments, the Ahmadiyya congregation is not silent. They try to survive and also accept these allegations while remaining active in conveying their teachings with cultural approaches. Ahmadis use a cultural approach to spread their teachings so that in this context, the Jemaah Ahmadiyya can be said to be a new social movement that emphasizes the use of cultural attributes in the implementation of its movements. In turn, the cultural approaches carried out by Jemaah Ahmadiyya are used to build a collective identity which will eventually be very useful for conveying Ahmadiyya teachings.
Cultural approaches carried out by Jemaah Ahmadiyya are not only useful to fortify their identities (rejecting identities) from parties outside of them, on the contrary more than that these efforts will be said to be useful for forming -borrowing the language of Castells-a project identity (Castells, 2010: 8).
"JAI's Cultural Approaches also reflect the rise of collective identity. JAI's actions don't only strive for survival and acceptance suggest that this group is not just a resistance identity, furthermore JAI's actions can be seen as effort to form a project identity" (Fadhillah, 2017: 50). The cultural approach is carried out through a series of humanitarian programs. One of them is for example through an eye donor program (cornea) and also a blood donor. The Ahmadiyya congregation is actively registered in campaigningdirectly or indirectlythe two humanitarian programs. For example, the most phenomenal is the blood donation movement through the Give Blood application, which was launched on May 26, 2018. Namely, the online blood donation system application is similar to online motorcycle taxi applications. A humanitarian innovation that is quite brilliant.
In the meantime, another humanitarian approach carried out in the context of 'campaigning for' love for those who have been 'hated' has been done through the Humanity First program which is active in the field of humanity. In 2018 for example, as released by the twitter account @humanityfirst_ID, a series of social service activities such as eye, dental, and general medical treatment services continued. This proves that there is a strategy, although the Ahmadiyya leadership of Indonesia refuses to call it a sporadic, strategy that is carried out in order to 'respond' to heretical stamps and get out of Islam that is attached to the Ahmadiyya Community.

Conclusion
Jemaah Ahmadiyya considers that fatwas are opinion. As is usual opinion, he must be respected. Disagreement with an opinion is common. Because opinions are not binding. As opinion, people may believe in opinions, may also not believe it. This kind of awareness is trying to be instilled and also practiced by the Ahmadiyya Community in various levels. By placing the fatwa as an opinion, Jemaah Ahmadiyya feels that it is not bound by a heretical fatwa and is out of Islam. counter the actual heretical labelling efforts carried out by the Jemaah Ahmadiyya. In this context the most prominent is in the field of humanity. This shows that Jemaah Ahmadiyya is also engaged in its own way in responding to the fatwa issued by the MUI. They, Jemaah Ahmadiyya, may always and always try to sow love, even to haters.
In the context of religion, every religious communities should have expressed their religious characters and practices in gentle way.
since, each religious communities have same responsibilities to lend their hands for the others and to express their religion beliefs gently and full of responsibility. moreover, in the context of maintaining diversity of Indonesia, practicing their religious beliefs in gentle way is a must.
Religious authority has a big responsibility to protect religious diversity in indonesia. MUI as one of religious authority should have seen wisely the difference of theology between ahmadiyah and mainstream islamist group. the approach of issuing a fatwa it,s not simply from theology approach, with astray labelling heretic as deviant.
however, sociological and anthropological approaches must be considered in relation to the survival and harmony of the nation and state On the other hand, the government has a great responsibility to guarantee independence in practicing the belief of each of its citizens.
All forms of violations, including violence against beliefs deemed different must be dealt firmly. This is important because in the context of freedom of practicing the belief that minority groups such as Ahmadiyah that experience three levels of discrimination as well as state level discrimination, semi-state level discrimination originating from religious authorities such as MUI and no-state level discrimination originating from intolerant groups