The Snouck Hurgronje’s Doctrine in Conquering the Holy Revolts of Acehnese Natives

This article aims to analyze the role of Christian Snouck Hurgronje in Aceh warfare (1873-1902). Snouck Hurgronje was involved in the Dutch war in Aceh by advising military chiefs of the best approach to conquer the insurgency in the Aceh region. The article is qualitative research, in which data is primarily extracted from secondary resources, such as books, journals, and other related sources on this topic. The paper found that after the Dutch declared war on Aceh on 26 March 1873, they were exhausted and lost against the Acehnese revolt. The Dutch government finally recruited an Islamic and Oriental expert from Leiden University, Prof Christian Snouck Hurgronje, to find the best way to conquer the rebellion in Aceh. This recruitment was also intertwined with the academic motivation of Hurgronje to understand Islam and its society of Aceh. Accordingly, Hurgronje suggested that the best solution to end the Acehnese resistance was by establishing a good partnership with the Acehnese royal chiefs called ‘Uleebalang’ on the one hand and demolishing the resistance groups that led by the ulama (Islamic scholars) groups on the other hand. Snouck Hurgronje believed that the ulama was the most radical Islamic institution who led a holy war against the Dutch colonial regime in Aceh. As a result, the Dutch military chief interpreted his recommendation by deploying all resources to hunt and execute the ulama and their followers. In some cases, this military operation caused a genocide of innocent peoples such as women, the elderly, and children.


Introduction
The history of conquering the Aceh sultanate by the Dutch colonial regime remains an exciting topic to discuss until the present day. Aceh War was accounted as the longest and the bloodiest war of the Dutch colonial in the Indies (the Dutch East Indies). Consequently, the war severely affected both parties: Aceh native people and the Dutch colonial regime.
The war began on 26 th March 1873, after Nieuwenhuyzen, the vice Governor-General (G.G.) of the Netherlands East -Indies (NEI) State 250 VOL. 10 NO. 2 DECEMBER 2021 from his warship -Citadel van Antwerpen, announced a war against the Aceh kingdom. Following this war declaration, the Dutch deployed around 3000 special forces that were led by Major General J.H.R.
Kohler, the former Military chief in Sumatera Barat. Unexpectedly, the resistance from the Acehnese natives was so massive and progressive.
Twelve cannons fired by Acehnese fighters hit the ship as a "welcome" sign to the invader. Two weeks later, or on 14 th April 1873, the military chief commander, Major General J.H.R. Köhler, was shot dead by Tengku Luengbata, an Acehnese sniper in front of Baiturrahman mosque (Paul van 't Veer, 1985: 35-36). The death of their commander demotivated Dutch soldiers and decided to retreat. Dutch authority withdrew their troops and returned to Batavia, and this loss had been published as headlines in various mass media in Europe, proving the Dutch powerlessness against the Acehnese native peoples.
In the second attack, the NEI finally seized the palace after collaborating with Teuku Nek Meuraxa, one of the Acehnese leaders who surrendered and betrayed his people to support the Dutch colonial regime. During the attack, the Dutch portrayed the brutality of military action against the Acehnese peoples. Kreike (2018: 297) described that the Aceh war caused hundreds of thousands of Acehnese killed, uncountable villages were burnt, and hectares of rice fields were destroyed. This condition had also led to malnutrition and starvation of the Acehnese people (Bergen, 2019: 22). Moreover, the Dutch invaders spread cholera endemic within the territory of Aceh that killed hundreds of people, including the Sultan of Aceh, Tgk Mahmudsyah (Bergen, 2019: 21;Paul van 't Veer, 1985: 71). Meanwhile, the Dutch lost millions of Gulden during the military aggression in Aceh and thousands of soldiers were murdered (Reid, 2006: 97). The Aceh war counted as the maddest and priciest battle for the Netherlands in the International Journal of Religious Literature and Heritage 251 modern era and caused severe casualties amongst Acehnese civilians by NIS in the nineteenth century (Kreike, 2018: 298).
Although the Dutch was successful in occupying Aceh capital, most of the countryside was still under the control of uleèëbalang or Acehnese royal chiefs (Reid, 2014:14). Hence, the Dutch was mistaken about Acehnese's character, as they were equated to the natives in Java Island. In Java, when the kings were no longer in power and had submitted to the Dutch colonial administration, the people would generally follow the king's decision. In contrast, the political power in Aceh was not centralized to the Sultan. However, every region within the Sultanate of Aceh was empowered by broad autonomy, led by uleèëbalang (Hurgronje, 2006: 116). The uleèëbalang were political leaders, jurists, and military commanders in their respective territories.
They mostly led the guerrilla war against the Dutch in Aceh (Reid, 2014:15). On the other hand, the rebellious movement against Dutch invaders was also led by ulama (Islamic scholar), which later dominated the resistance after most royal chiefs conceded to the Dutch invader. The ulama proclaimed the holy war (perang sabil), which urged all Acehnese to rise against the infidels of invaders (Alfian, 1987;Reid, 2014 (Atjehers) is not solely the academic work on Islam and the people of Aceh but also the espionage mission against the existence of ulama Aceh, by using those references to advise the military chief in Aceh.
'De Atjehers' book, or in English translation 'the Acehnese,' especially the last two volumes, is believed to be an espionage report on the life and behavior of the Acehnese people. Counter-insurgency issues, such as an appointment to investigate the causes of an insurgency, which has already been extinguished, did not yet involve an ethnologist approach in what one should call 'counter-insurgency research.' One could imagine that the mission's aim is solely to acquire insight into the deeper causes of such a revolt and enable the governments to design a better policy for the future that could eliminate the roots of discontent.
I firstly develop these claims by engaging with several issues raised by many contemporary Acehnese scholars. What was the role of Hurgronje in the war of Aceh during the Dutch invasion to the land?
What was the relationship between Hurgronje's research on Acehnese culture and the warfare strategy of Dutch military operation in conquering Aceh territory? What was the impact of Hurgronje's recommendations towards the political and social structure of Aceh society during the warfare and aftermath? Part I will briefly introduce the background of the study, followed by part II of Hurgronje's journey to the Indies and his involvement in the war of Aceh. Finally, Part III 254 VOL. 10 NO. 2 DECEMBER 2021 describes the idea of Hurgronje on Dutch war strategies in conquering the Acehnese rebellion. Part IV describes the conclusion of this paper.

Method
This paper employed qualitative research approach that describes phenomena or events related to the topic. All data are extracted from secondary resources, mainly books, journals, and other related references. Next, the author will examine, analyze and connect the intertwining between the role of Snouck Hurgronje as an Islamic scholar and the Dutch military operation in Aceh in conquering the revolt of the Acehnese natives.

Result and Discussion
Understanding the East Indies from the Arab Network conditions had been fulfilled and, therefore, this concept was incorrectly used to justify the holy uprising war in Cilegon, Banten, and Bekasi. Overall, the book argued that the jihadist could not be considered defenders of the faith but rather as chaos creators to the legitimate authority of the Dutch (Kaptein, 2014:122).
Successful in giving political advice in defeating the jihadist movement in Java, Snouck Hurgronje traveled to Aceh to study the motive of Acehnese resistance against the Dutch ruler. The NIS authority believed that Snouck Hurgronje was the best option to explore the weakness of the Acehnese rebellion through grounded anthropological and sociological studies. Overall, the primary mission of Hurgronje in Aceh was to understand the rule of ulama (Islamic scholars) and the social-religious basis of Acehnese people resistance to the Dutch colonial state (Paul van 't Veer, 1985: 152). According to Snouck Hurgronje, the failure of the NIS occupation to force people recognise the Dutch authority in Aceh was due to the lack of Dutch officers' knowledge of Aceh as an Islamic region (Koningsveld, 1989).
That is why, when Snouck Hurgronje served and lived in Aceh, he studied characters of the Acehnese community, either directly from the people or from literature written by Acehnese scholars, such as the book of 'Umdat al-Muhtajin Ila Suluk Maslak al-Mufridin' written by Sheikh Abdul Rauf Syiah Kuala. Snouck Hurgronje believed that the book had also influenced the jihadists to organize the jihad against the Dutch infidels in Aceh since the book consists of the substance of how to seek Allah's pleasures (Yusof et al., 2016: 113) and thus, jihad is strongly believed to be the best way to do.
It was widely known that before Snouck Hurgronje was recruited as the Dutch advisor, the war in Aceh had been raging for about 20 years and the Dutch just occupied a few territorial in Aceh. Since 1873, NIS troops fought almost continuously against an unremittingly fierce Acehnese resistance (Bloembergen, 2006:170). The war also took a massive blow for the Dutch treasury by keeping large troops and resources (Missbach, 2010: 46). To respond to this situation, the Dutch established a new strategy called 'concentration system' in 1884, which focused on defending the Dutch military occupation in Koetaradja (Banda Aceh) and Aceh Besar territorial. The concentration system tactic aimed at reducing the cost of the colonial administration of the war, which had ballooned due to the size of the military operations (Kreike, 2018). Moreover, this tactic had made the Dutch colonial zone very limited to just twenty square kilometers in the Koetaraja vicinity.
This defensive line was provided with watchtowers, connected streets, and even telegraph wire. With this system, the Dutch expected future developments more defensively, and armed forces were not allowed to fight the jihadist outside that protected areas (Missbach, 2010: 47;Paul van 't Veer, 1985: 125).
However, this defensive approach did not guarantee that the Dutch would stay safely within the protected areas. For the next following years, the bloodshed continued on both sides. In 1888, Tgk. Chik Ditiro (1836-1891), the most popular ulama during the Dutch war in Aceh, led different attacks and sabotaged Dutch logistics, demolished telegraph masts, destroyed railways and other Dutch military facilities (Missbach, 2010: 47-48). In July 1889, Ditiro led another attack to a Dutch army camp nearby Koetaradja, which caused 22 Dutch soldiers death and 94 injured. In Idi (East Aceh), a great battle between mujahedeen and the Dutch army from May to June 1890 caused massive losses on both sides (Paul van 't Veer, 1985: 81).
To counter the Ditiro jihadists, the Dutch recruited native soldiers from Java and Ambon ethnic groups to fight against Acehnese combatants (Wisnosky, 2018). The colonialist also recruited local 'traitors' to spy and work for them. For instance, in 1891, Ditiro was poisoned and eventually killed by the son of local royal chief Mukim XXII after receiving an order from the Dutch rulers (Ago, 2018;Taylor, 2003: 366 (Günther andLawson, 2016: 1147).
The song had also massively provoked Acehnese people to oppose the Dutch and inspire a sense of obligatory duty to fight against the Dutch no matter their gender and age (Alfian, 1992: 13).
After the bloody war between Dutch invaders and native Acehnese from 1873 to 1891, the Netherlands accounted for 200 million florins loss, 1,280 people were killed, and 5,287 were injured (Alfian, 1987: 82). Colonel F. Kompe van Meerdervoort, who succeeded General van Teijn in May 1891, changed the war policy by supporting a soft "political" approach and opened the trade blockade to Aceh under the Dutch rules (Gobee & Adriannse, 1990: LXIV;Reid, 2005: 294).
Nonetheless, the colonial ministry opposed his policy, and Colonel C.
Deijkerhoff replaced his position as the next civilian and military Governor of Aceh in January 1892 (Paul van 't Veer, 1985: 147). On the other hand, Hurgronje was conducting an investigation on religion and politics in Aceh to seek the answer on what is the best approach to finish the Acehnese resistance against the Dutch colonial state that has made the credibility of the Netherlands as one of the world's power at that time in doubt against the native Acehnese.

Snouck Hurngronje's Approach to End the Acehnese Resistance
Snouck Hurgronje stayed in Koetaraja (Aceh) from 16 July 1891 to 4 February 1892, living among Acehnese natives who had surrendered or accepted a short declaration (Korte vaklaring)a recognition to the Dutch sovereignity. By identifying himself as a Muslim or an Islamic scholar, Snouck Hurgronje discovered plenty of the war strategies against the resistance of mujahideen from native informants who surrendered or worked for the colonialist.
In 1892, he completed all chapters of his report, namely 'Atjeh-verslag' (Aceh Report) or also known as Verslag omtrent de religieus-poltieke toestanden in Aceh (The report on the political-religious situation in Aceh) and handed out to Governor-General of Dutch Indies, Pijnacker Hordijk. This report later was published into a book titled 'de Atjeher'.
The book consists of four volumes; the first two volumes explain the Acehnese people's history, social structure, daily life and folk-culture, source of laws, political and government structure. Meanwhile, the last two volumes of the report remained secret (Paul van 't Veer, 1985: p.153). However, the last two chapters was later summarized by Gobee and Andriaanse, and thus entitled Ambtelijke Adviezen van C. Snouck According to Snouck Hurgronje, the riskiest threat to security and order in the Dutch colonial state is the Islam institution (ulama), and Islam in Aceh was believed to be based on orthodox offshoot (Gobee & Adriannse, 1990: XLIV). Snouck Hurgronje argued that Islam must be negatively judged, as it can evoke anti-Dutch fanaticism. In his report, he described that Acehnese has a "fanatical and treacherous population, turbulent and warlike to a degree unknown among the other races of the Archipelago" (Hurgronje, 1906b: ix). Thus, Hurgronje thought that the best solution to overcome the jihadists' resistance in Aceh was by deploying a massive military outbreak onto International Journal of Religious Literature and Heritage 261 the remote areas of Aceh territory (Ahmad et al., 1982: 79;Ricklefs, 1993:145).
Hurgronje identified ulama as an identity encouraging the fight with the jihad doctrine against the existence of the Dutch regime in Aceh (Alfian, 1987: 22;Hurgronje, 1906a: 172). He believes that while a Dutch spy poisoned Ditiro in 1891, several ulama still played an essential role in combating the Dutch colonial regime in Aceh. He stated in the Acehnese vol. I that "the progress of the Acehnese war has proved extremely favorable to the ulama and their class" (Hurgronje, 1906a: 172 (Alfian, 1987: 82;Gobée and Anriaanse, 1990: 242).
Accordingly, Hurgronje advised the authorities not to negotiate with the ulama groups, but should attack them as severely as possible (Gobee & Adriannse, 1990: LXVII). The Dutch military should abandon its half-hearted military approach, resort to massive force without mercy, and destroy all ulama and its followers into the most remote corners of Aceh territory (Vrolijk & Leeuwen, 2013: 132).
Hurgronje also argued that there could be no hope of winning over the hostile ulama, who should, therefore, be ruthlessly hunted down (Laffan, 2003). Thus, religious leaders in the Acehnese society should be demolished, so that the influence of Islam is decreasing in Aceh, as he states in the Acehnese vol. II that "the ulama proceed to form themselves into a political party and to interfere in the affairs of state, they present to our view a most unpleasing spectacle" (Hurgronje, 1906a: 332). For Hurgronje, only by diminishing the ulama and Islam conservative roles, the Dutch could create and guarantee a permanent exercise of authority within Aceh land. In the 'very secret' report, as quoted by Gobee and Adriannse (1990) (Paul van 't Veer, 1985: 74).
Snouck Hurgronje also believed that uleèëblang was the origin and legitimate ruler in his region and the 'real' state institution with the power within the Acehnese society. While the Sultan had no power unless supported by the royal chiefs (Gobee & Adriannse, 1990: 57).
Thus, he suggested eradicating and ignoring the Sultan of Aceh and promoting the uleèëblang groups as the regional representatives of the Dutch colonial state. Hurgronje further argued that political colonialism strategy like the one practiced in Java (recruiting adat chiefs in Java as employees of the NIS) could also be applied in Aceh.
In contrast, he regards Islam politics that campaigned by ulama groups could deliberate threat to peace and order in Aceh (Gobee E and Adriannse C, 1990, p. XLVIII).
The idea to establish the alliance with uleèëblang was implemented by General Deijkerhoff, in which he supported the plan of Teuku Umar, the royal chief from Mukim IV (West Aceh), to combat a group of ulama in that region. Teuku Umar also assisted the Dutch to occupy all areas in Mukim XXV and XXVI of Aceh Besar from Acehnese jihadists. On 30 December 1893, Teuku Umar was appointed as a commander in Chief by NIS authority after defeating ulama rebellion in West Aceh, and with his fifteen commanders vowed to be loyal to the Dutch (Paul van 't Veer, 1985: 149). In consequence, most Acehnese jihadists doubted attacking the Teuku Umar and his troops because he is a Muslim. The question emerged among the ulama, whether fighting against Teuku Umar is jihad or not. This situation had immediately and significantly reduced the fighting desire on the Acehnese side at that time.
In 1896, after received 380 modern cock rifles, 500 ancient rifles, 25.000 bullets, 500 kilos of gunpowder, 120.000 axes of gunpowder, 5.000 kilos tin to replenish ammunition, and 18.000 Spanish ringgits as a war fund, Teuku Umar deserted and attacked back the Dutch aggressors (Paul van 't Veer, 1985: 164). The news of the Teuku Umar deserting had shocked the Dutch Governor-general, van der Wijck in Batavia and the capital, Den Haag. Dutchmen in the mother land longmarched and sang a song "Teuku Umar die moet hange, Aan een touw, aan een touw Teuku Umar en zijn vrouw" (Teuku Umar should be hang, on a rope, on a rope, Teuku Umar and his wife). As a result, General Deijkerhoff was fired in the following days, and his position was replaced by General Vetter, who acted as a commissioner for Aceh, while the Aceh military chief was commanded by Colonel Stemfoort (Paul van 't Veer, 1985: 175-193). Colonel Stemfoort revived the brutality of Dutch military action in Aceh, one of which was shooting Teuku Nyak Makam to death in front of his children and wife, slaughtering him, and displaying his head in the aisle of the Dutch military hospital in Koetaradja in a jar containing alcohol in 1897 (Paul van Veer, 1985: 194).
In 1898, Joannes Benedictus (J.B) van Heutsz was entitled as a military governor in Aceh. In the same year, Snouck Hurgronje was named an advisor for native affairs with particular responsibility for Aceh. They both worked like 'hardware' and 'software' in the Dutch war against Aceh. Hurgronje continued to advocate decisive action against the Acehnese with anti-guerrilla tactics by recommending to stop the passive confinement within the concentration line and adopt International Journal of Religious Literature and Heritage 265 an aggressive type of warfare (Locher-Scholten, 2018: 200-201). For Hurgronje, a large military expedition to destroy the Acehnese resistance commanded by ulama was necessary if the Dutch wanted to establish an orderly and peaceful territory in Aceh. If possible, all rebellion leaders should be arrested alive or death to achieve a state of security in Aceh (Gobée & Anriaanse, 1990: 194 (Gerretson, 1958: 132;Reid, 2006: 101). The Dutch deployed about 7500 anti-guerrilla units (marechaussee) fully equipped with modern and local traditional weapons (Paul van 't Veer, 1985: 197). The attack on the emergency capital of Keumala was the most extraordinary military operation of the entire war in Aceh and counted as the total attack tactic as suggested by Hurgronje. During his military campaigns, van Heutsz often refers to Hurgronje 's idea, hit and hunt the enemy ruthlessly, the van Heutsz commanded his troop to use brutal force, and he proved strikingly successful where others had failed (Vrolijk and Leeuwen, 2013: 132).
After successfully destroying the jihadist headquarters in Pidie, van Heutsz also deployed six brigades of his elite force (marechaussee) and one infantry battalion in West Aceh to hunt Teuku Umar, the most wanted enemy of the Dutch colonial state. After receiving information from a local spy, Lieutenant Verbrugh, and assisted by eighteen 'marechaussee' militias from Java and Ambon, the Dutch army set up a trap to catch Teuku Umar and his units (Paul van 't Veer, 1985: 200).

Teuku Umar was shot to death by Van Heutsz elite force on 11
February 1899, in the ensuing fight (J.I. (Hans) Bakker, 1993: 8). His body was buried in Mugo village by his followers, but then van Heutsz ordered his people to break into his graveyard, and the dead body was stepped onto the bamboo to be shown to the people (Dumadi, 1983: 3).
Hence, the Dutch cruelty towards Acehnese was not only for living people. Evenmore, corpses were also ruthlessly beleaguered and tortured.
Van Heutsz adopted various methods to overcome the resistance of the Acehnese. In January 1903, the last Sultan of Aceh, Daudsyah, finally surrendered to Dutch after the marechaussee kidnapped his wife and son in December 1902 (Paul van Veer, 1985: 205). His submission was also followed by his military commander Teuku Panglima Polem.
The surrender of the Sultan and Panglima Polem meant an official declaration for Dutch victory in the Aceh war. In 1904, van Heutsz was promoted to be the governor-general of the NIS, while Hurgronje was still in his position as the Dutch advisor for native affairs. Both had organized some ruthless pursuits killing 20,000 Acehnese from 1898 to 1909 when Heutsz was the governor of Aceh; around was killed (Kreike, 2018;Paul van 't Veer, 1985: 217;Reid, 2006: 101). The genocide of the Acehnese was also executed by Lieutenant Colonel L.L.E. van Daalen, the successor of van Heutsz. In his military expedition to Gayo land in 1904, his 'mareschossee' killed around 3000 Gayo and Alas peasants in the villages of Kuta Reh, Likat, and Kuto Lengat, more than a third of whom were innocent women and children (Alfian, 1987: 209;J.I. (Hans) Bakker, 1993:58).
International Journal of Religious Literature and Heritage 267 Before van Daalen massacred people in Gayo-Alas, Hurgronje had described in his report on "Atjeh-Verlag" about the people in Gayo. He said that the highland was the best place for the Acehnese combatants to hide during guerrilla warfare, where the dense forest and swamps enable them to cover themselves from the Dutch military attack (Hurgronje, 1906b: xiv). Then, Hurgronje recommended the army expedition to track down the guerillas towards the central highland (Hurgronje, 1906b: xvi (Alfian, 1987: 6). Upon investigation, Dutch concluded that the Sultan had initiated the attack led by Panglima Nyak Asan and Nyak Abaih. The Governor of Van Daalen decided to exile the Sultan to Ambon (Alfian, 1987: 201).
Since then, the resistance of Acehnese to Dutch authority gradually declined. Nonetheless, the battle continuously occurred until 1912 from East to West, and from the North to the Southern regions of Aceh.
By 1913, after almost forty years of the battle, the Dutch proclaimed that they had conquered Aceh territory. The colonial government had controlled politics and trade, and several traditional ruling class (the royal family) had submitted their lands to the Dutch authority.
However, the killing continuously occurred, but it was not exclusively directed against guerrillas led by ulama. Acehnese fought through individual suicide violence or Dutch called 'Atjeh moorden' (Aceh Murders). This new type of Acehnese resistance attacked Dutch residents conducted in solo action (Kloos, 2014: 25). Killing the Dutch, or Aceh called 'poh kaphe' occurred after the Dutch portrayed the brutality towards Acehnese people. For the Acehnese, killing or being killed will have the same values, as they may obtain the degree of syahid (martyr). Similarly, in North Aceh, commander of the 5 th Division of Mareshossee, Captain C.E. Schmid also died on 10 July 1933, after being stabbed by an Acehnese, using his traditional weapon, rencong (Kloos, 2014: 25;Tengkuputeh, 2018). R.A Kern believed that the 'Atjeh Moorden' or Dutch called 'Gekke Atjehsche' as a symptom of mental illness, and jihad fisabilillah was the factor that motivated Acehnese natives to do this action. According to Kern, the tradition of jihad and hatred to nonbelievers had inspired the native Aceh to kill the Dutch officer individually (Kloos, 2014: 43;R.A. Kern, 2017).
Whereas others believed that the perpetrators were healthy people, they wanted revenge on what the Dutch had done to the Acehnese. Finally, every violence manifested in a confrontation, as shown by the International Journal of Religious Literature and Heritage 269 Acehnese, as resistance to cruelty for humanity portrayed by the Dutch colonial state after they invaded the land of Aceh.

Conclusion
The Dutch colonial state's declaration of war on Aceh sultanate became a remarkable history for the Netherlands and Indonesia, particularly for Aceh. For the Dutch side, the war resulted in the most significant casualties and massive loss of its treasury in the history of the Dutch colonialization in the archipelago. Whereas for Aceh society, the war that occurred for almost 70 years (1873-1942) had not solely diminished the kingdom of Aceh but also undermined Aceh's civilization and killed hundreds of thousands of civilians.
After the Dutch conquered the capital of Aceh in 1874, the resistance to the Dutch colonial government emerged everywhere, except a few of those who recognized the Dutch sovereignty and subdued their life to work for the colonial interests. The Sultan of Aceh, local lords, and ulama, played an important role in countering the colonizer's invasion.
However, since the Sultan's death and most of the royal chiefs surrendered to the Dutch, ulama took turn in leading the revolt. The doctrine of jihad prompted by the ulama to encourage all Acehnese to do jihad had been considered as the most dangerous threat for the Dutch colonialist.
The role of Hurgronje as a political advisor on the Aceh affairs had made the military operation bloodier. The Dutch elite corps interpreted his recommendation to diminish the ulama parties by deploying all resources to execute the ulama and their followers. In some cases, this military operation caused a genocide of innocent peoples such as women, the elderly, and children. For Acehnese, the war against the